In this paper we will show that certain networks called 'inhibition nets' may be regarded as cognitive agents drawing nonmonotonic inferences. It will be proven that the system CL (introduced by KLM in [Artificial Intelligence 44 (1990) 186-189]) of nonmonotonic logic is both sound and complete with respect to the inferences drawn by finite hierarchical inhibition nets. The latter class of inhibition nets is shown to correspond to the class of finite, normal, hierarchical logic programs concerning dynamics, and also to the class of binary, layered, input-driven artificial neural networks. This paper deals with a class of networks called 'inhibition nets'. Inhibition nets are special cases of artificial neural networks, but they have a simpler net-like structure than the nets usually studied. Inhibition nets are also formal analogues of the biological networks in the brain, however on a level of abstraction that is higher than the level of the well-known connectionist machines. However, we will see that every artificial neural net of a certain kind may be simulated by an inhibition net. The main structural characteristic of inhibition nets is that there are not only excitatory connections between nodes but also inhibitory connections between nodes and excitatory connections. We will view inhibition nets as cognitive agents in a way that contents of belief are not assigned to the activities of single nodes but rather to patterns of activity, i.e., we employ distributed representation. The state transitions, which lead from an initial activity pattern to a final stable pattern, will be regarded as nonmonotonic inferences from an initial total belief to a final (plausible) belief. What this means exactly will be explained later on. The nonmonotonicity of the inferences drawn by inhibition nets is due to the effect of inhibitory connections.
This paper deals with a class of networks called 'inhibition nets'. Inhibition nets are special cases of artificial neural networks, but they have a simpler net-like structure than the nets usually studied. Inhibition nets are also formal analogues of the biological networks in the brain, however on a level of abstraction that is higher than the level of the well-known connectionist machines. However, we will see that every artificial neural net of a certain kind may be simulated by an inhibition net. The main structural characteristic of inhibition nets is that there are not only excitatory connections between nodes but also inhibitory connections between nodes and excitatory connections. We will view inhibition nets as cognitive agents in a way that contents of belief are not assigned to the activities of single nodes but rather to patterns of activity, i.e., we employ distributed representation. The state transitions, which lead from an initial activity pattern to a final stable pattern, will be regarded as nonmonotonic inferences from an initial total belief to a final (plausible) belief. What this means exactly will be explained later on. The nonmonotonicity of the inferences drawn by inhibition nets is due to the effect of inhibitory connections.
We hope our investigations to be relevant (i) for nonmonotonic reasoning, since it is proven that a network with properties similar to those of a logic program is able to reason cumulatively, (ii) for epistemic logic, since metalinguistic expressions for beliefs, total beliefs and dispositions of inferential behaviour are introduced, which are satisfied by net-like agents without a detour to possible worlds semantics, (iii) for the study of the relationship between the symbolic computation and the dynamical systems paradigm, since the state transitions in inhibition nets may be described correctly and completely on the cognitive level by symbolic terms, (iv) for the study of neural networks, since neural nets of a certain kind are also shown to reason cumulatively, and (v) for cognitive psychology since the results of this paper might contribute to our understanding of how we are able to draw plausible commonsense inferences (although we have to admit that the agents we consider are highly idealized beings). Here is the plan of the paper: in the first section we recall some relevant background information concerning networks and nonmonotonic reasoning. In the second section inhibition nets are defined and a basic lemma on their topology is derived. The third section demonstrates that inhibition nets may be regarded as certain dynamical systems with convenient properties. The fourth section is devoted to the interpretation of these dynamical systems as cognitive agents which have beliefs and which draw inferences. In the fifth section the main results are presented and proven, i.e., (i) a soundness result stating that the inferences drawn by finite hierarchical inhibition nets obey the rules of CL, and (ii) a completeness result stating that for every agent which is disposed to draw inferences obeying these rules there is a finite hierarchical inhibition net which is disposed to draw precisely the same inferences. The sixth section deals with the relationship between inhibition nets and other nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms, particularly logic programs employing negation as failure. The seventh section relates inhibition nets to more usual kinds of artificial neural networks. In the last section some implications of our results are discussed. Appendix A summarizes the system CL and restates briefly the necessary logical definitions; Appendix B does the same for the essentials of logic programming.
Background
Throughout the paper we will partially employ the terminology of dynamical systems theory and of connectionism, and we will introduce abstract surrogates of some of the concepts used in these fields. At the same time the networks we consider reason according to a set of symbolically represented rules of a system of nonmonotonic logic. This may seem strange in view of the notorious opposition of the symbolic computation paradigm and the dynamical hypothesis paradigm (van Gelder [9] ) in cognitive science. According to Smolensky's [30, subsymbolic hypothesis, "The intuitive processor is a subconceptual connectionist dynamical system that does not admit a complete, formal, and precise conceptual-level description." However, as Gärdenfors [8] argues, the two paradigms should better be seen as complementing each other. Moreover, the paradigms have originally not been viewed as being adversary at all: e.g., the seminal paper by McCulloch and Pitts [20] , which is a kind of paragon for our approach, explicitly tries to "treat neural events and relations by means of propositional logic".
Since its publication in the 1940s the McCulloch and Pitts model has been critized for various reasons:
(i) the networks used are neurobiologically implausible, (ii) single nodes are interpreted as representing propositions and thus localized representations are employed rather than distributed ones, as connectionism has it, and (iii) classical propositional logic is used on the symbolic side where perhaps a system of nonmonotonic reasoning would be more adequate, since such systems are supposed to be closer to the commonsense reasoning our brains are usually involved in. In the following sections we will introduce a class of networks for which claim (i) is still true-which we accept for the sake of abstraction and simplicity-but the subsequent results will show that the objections expressed in (ii) and (iii) would fail if they were directed towards our approach.
The combination of neural networks with nonmonotonic reasoning has also been suggested by a handful of other authors: Valiant [31, Chapter 13.5] discusses the nonmonotonic phenomena occuring in both commonsense reasoning and neural network design. Schurz [26, p. 59 ] explicitly compares the computations of biological and artificial neurons to the applications of default rules in nonmonotonic reasoning. Both papers state the general idea but omit details and results. The most extensive treatment of this topic is to be found in Balkenius and Gärdenfors [2] and Gärdenfors [8] , where it is shown that state transitions in artificial neural networks may be considered as nonmonotonic reasoning processes. The ideas introduced in the latter two papers have been a major source of inspiration for various sections of this paper, in particular for our net semantics of defeasible conditionals in Section 4. As indicated by Balkenius and Gärdenfors [2, 8] , the state transitions within many neural networks lack properties which are characteristic of plausible reasoning (like cumulativity). However, nets with so-called "shunting" interaction of inputs (see [2, p. 33] ) are hypothesized to reason cumulatively; but this is not proven by the authors, but only suggested by extensive computer simulations. Put shortly, the results in [2, 8] are restricted in certain ways, and these restrictions seem to be due to the complexity of signal propagation in arbitrary neural networks. This is one reason why we restrict ourselves to the simpler case of inhibition nets (and, in Section 7, to a subclass of the class of artificial neural networks).
The system CL referred to above is a set of rules for defeasible conditionals of the form α ⇒ β where ⇒ is a new connective different from the material implication of propositional logic. KLM [14] prove that CL has a sound and complete normal states semantics for models consisting of interpreted states ordered according to their degree of normality. A conditional α ⇒ β is true in such a model if and only if in the most normal states among those in which α holds, β holds as well. For example, the conditional bird ⇒ flyer would be true if and only if in the most normal environmental situations, in which there is a distinguished object x such that x is a bird, x also has the ability to fly. In the net semantics to be developed below the conditional α ⇒ β will not be satisfied by models of ordered states, but by interpreted inhibition nets considered as cognitive agents. α ⇒ β is true of such an agent if and only if the agent is disposed to draw the conclusion that β holds, whenever it has an input corresponding to the belief that α is true and α is everything the agent is asked to believe by the input. Defeasible conditionals will thus be used as descriptive sentences about certain cognitive properties of agents and not as descriptive sentences about the normality structure of the world. This is, of course, not a new way of interpreting defeasible conditionals. Basically, all autoepistemic approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning use a logical syntax expressing various cognitive properties of agents.
Independently, Horgan and Tienson [12] argue that ceteris paribus laws (which they call "soft laws") would be the appropriate laws for psychology. They regard such laws as the "natural expression of a defeasible causal tendency" (p. 109) in a cognitive dynamical system. Cognitive states are viewed as emitting forces which tend to activate other cognitive states, but only if there is no further active state with a stronger contrary impulse which defeats the first one. According to Horgan and Tienson this is best described by ceteris paribus laws as opposed to the exceptionless "hard" laws expressible in classical logic. As Schurz [28] (see also [29] ) has shown, important cases of ceteris paribus laws may be reconstructed formally as defeasible conditionals (called "normic conditionals" by Schurz) ruled by the well-known system P used, e.g., by Pearl [22] , KLM [14] and Schurz [27] . The system CL employed in this paper is a subsystem of P.
Inhibition nets
Inhibition nets are directed graphs with two kinds of edges:
(i) edges between nodes, and (ii) edges between nodes and edges of type (i):
Definition 2.1.
(1) Let N be a nonempty set (the set of nodes).
(2) Let E ⊆ N × N (the set of excitatory connections). (3) Let I ⊆ N × E (the set of inhibitory connections). (4) Let bias ∈ N be fixed (the bias node). Then I = N, E, I, bias is an inhibition net(work).
In the following we use 'm' and 'n' (with or without indices) as variables ranging over nodes, 'e' for edges; 'i', 'j ', 'k', 'u', 'v' will always range over natural numbers. We will say that m E n (or m I n), when we actually mean that m, n ∈ E (or m, n ∈ I ).
It may help to think of nodes as neurons, of the excitatory connections between nodes as excitatory connections between neurons, and of inhibitory connections as formal counterparts of presynaptic inhibitory connections (see, e.g., Eccles [7, pp. 124-127] ). By means of the latter neurons may inhibit excitatory connections between other neurons without inhibiting the target neurons of such connections themselves. But inhibition nets are of course far from being plausible models of real neural assemblies. Moreover, inhibition nets are also quite different from the usual artificial neural networks, since there are no weigths associated with the connections, there are no inhibitory connections from nodes to other nodes, and, as will be seen later, there are no continuous activation states for nodes, no weighted input summation within nodes, and no complex activation functions. Finally, no use is made of learning procedures, as it is usually the case in neural network design.
The bias node bias will be the only node which is active in every state of the network. Thus we may assume that there is no n ∈ N such that n E bias, since excitatory connections to bias would be without any use anyway.
Furthermore we need the following concepts:
Definition 2.2. Let I = N, E, I, bias be an inhibition net:
(1) A path is a sequence n 0 , . . . , n k (k > 0) of nodes such that for all i ∈ {0, . . ., k − 1}: n i E n i+1 , or there is an n ∈ N such that n i I n, n i+1 . We will say that such a path has length k. Generally, if m 1 E m 2 , or there is an n ∈ N such that m 1 I n, m 2 , we will say that m 1 is connected to m 2 (in this order). (2) An E-path is a path n 0 , . . . , n k of nodes such that for all i ∈ {0, . . ., k − 1}:
n i E n i+1 . (3) A cycle is a path n 0 , . . . , n k where n 0 = n k .
Definition 2.3. Let I = N, E, I, bias be an inhibition net.
I is hierarchical iff it does not have cycles.
Hierarchical inhibition nets will be shown to have the property that none of their nodes has influence on its own activity, neither by excitation nor by inhibition. However, such nets may, e.g., contain nodes m 1 , m 2 , n 1 , n 2 such that m 1 I m 2 , n 2 and m 2 I m 1 , n 1 : in such a case m 1 and m 2 will mutually inhibit each other's spreading activity. But such a form of mutual inhibition is not circular or nonhierarchical in the sense specified above.
Contrary to arbitrary inhibition nets, hierarchical inhibition nets will be proven to have unique stable states of activity given a constant input state. This is the reason why we will mainly concentrate our efforts on them. Moreover, we will only focus on finite hierarchical inhibition nets (FHINs) for the sake of simplicity, and because they are the practically relevant ones. Definition 2.3 obviously implies:
Remark 1. If n 0 , . . . , n k is a path in an FHIN, then n i = n j for i = j , because otherwise there would be cycles. Thus in an FHIN there are only finitely many paths between two nodes, since there are only finitely many nodes.
In Figs. 1 and 2 you can see two FHINs (in the first case we have omitted the bias node graphically), which we will use as examples throughout the paper. They are defined in the following way: 4 } is a set of 5 nodes, n 1 E 1 n 2 , n 1 E 1 n 3 , n 4 I 1 n 1 , n 2 , and there are no other connections. Example 2.5. I 2 = N 2 , E 2 , I 2 , bias such that N = {bias, n 1 , n 2 , n 3 }, bias E 2 n 1 , n 2 E 2 n 3 , n 3 I 2 bias, n 1 , and there are no other connections. Now we will state and prove a lemma, which will give us some basic information about the topology of FHINs: (1) for all m, n ∈ N such that there is a path from m to n, it holds that: m ∈ N i , n ∈ N j for i < j, (2) for every n ∈ N \ N 0 there is an m ∈ N 0 such that there is an E-path from m to n, (3) N 0 is the set of all nodes with (E-)indegree 0, i.e., the set of nodes without excitatory connections leading to them, (4) bias ∈ N 0 .
Proof.
• N, E is a finite directed acyclic graph (DAG), and thus it has a unique nonempty point base N 0 ⊆ N where N 0 is the set of all vertices with indegree 0 (see, e.g., Harary [11, p. 201] ), i.e., for every node n ∈ N \ N 0 there is a node m ∈ N 0 such that there is an E-path from m to n, and there is no E-path between nodes in N 0 .
• Now let N i be the set of nodes n ∈ N such that the maximal length of a path from a node in N 0 to n is i (for all i with 1 i). Since every node n ∈ N \ N 0 is reachable from a node in N 0 by our selection of N 0 , and since there are only finitely many paths from nodes in N \ N 0 to such an n (by Remark 1), there is indeed a path with maximal length to n, i.e., there is an i such that n ∈ N i . By maximality we have N i ∩ N j = ∅ for i = j .
• Furthermore, if N i is not empty for some i > 0, then also N i−1 is not empty: for there is an n ∈ N i such that there is a maximal path m = n 0 , . . . , n i−1 , n i = n where m ∈ N 0 ; but then m = n 0 , . . . , n i−1 is also a maximal path from a node in N 0 to n i−1 and thus N i−1 = ∅, or else there would be a longer path m 0 , . . . , m k = n i−1 with m 0 ∈ N 0 , k > i − 1; in the latter case n i would not be one of the nodes in m 0 , . . . , m k , since otherwise there would be cycles in I; it would follow that m 0 , . . . , m k , n i is a path with length k + 1 > i (m k = n i−1 is connected to n i by the existence of the path n 0 , . . . , n i−1 , n i ); but this contradicts that n ∈ N i .
• This implies that for some k 0 the sets N 0 , . . . , N k are disjoint, nonempty, and
• Now suppose m, n ∈ N such that there is a path from m to n, where m ∈ N i , n ∈ N j : the longest path m 0 , . . . , m i = m from a node m 0 in N 0 to m has length i; by assumption there is a path m = n 0 , . . . , n k = n from m to n; m 0 , . . . , m i and n 0 , . . . , n k have no nodes in common except m, or else there would be cycles. Thus by concatenating the two paths we see that the longest path from a node in N 0 to n has length j > i.
• The last three claims from above hold because of our selection of N 0 , and our assumption that there are no excitatory connections to bias. ✷ Lemma 2.6 shows that FHINs are layered (if n ∈ N i then we will say that n is within the layer i). We are going to see that in FHINs the activity of a node in layer i solely depends on the activity of nodes in layers j < i. Formally, it is easier to deal with FHINs than with arbitrary inhibition nets just because of this layered structure. Lemma 2.6 leads to the following definition: Canonical partitions are in fact determined uniquely, but this is not important in the following.
Example 2.8. In the case of I 1 we get the canonical partition {bias, n 1 , n 4 }, {n 2 , n 3 } . In the case of I 2 the canonical partition is {bias, n 2 }, {n 3 }, {n 1 } .
The layered structure of FHINs is analogous to the layered structure of various neural structures and artificial neural networks. In the latter case, however, the nodes of a layer i may usually only be connected to the nodes of the subsequent layer i + 1, whereas in our case the nodes of layer i may be connected to the nodes of layers with any index larger than i, or to excitatory connections leading to nodes of such layers. Lemma 2.6 entails the following straightforward though important remark:
(1) ∃m ∈ N such that m E n, iff ∃m ∈ N j with j < i such that m E n. (2) ∃m ∈ N such that m I m, n (for some m), iff ∃m ∈ N u with u < i such that m I m, n (for some m).
Inhibition nets as dynamical systems
Analogous to usual neural networks also inhibition nets may be considered as dynamical systems. First of all, we postulate that the nodes of inhibition nets may have a certain activity. We will restrict the types of such activity states of nodes to discrete binary states, i.e., to 1 ("on") and 0 ("off").
We assume that nets are fed by inputs which dictate certain nodes to fire independently of the current net state. This is the external causal dynamics of inhibition nets. Typically, these inputs may be thought of as sensory inputs. The only generalization we apply compared to the inputs to usual neural networks is that we allow inputs to affect the whole network and not just a distinguished layer of input nodes.
The internal causal dynamics of inhibition nets is the evolution of states determined by the input and the topology of the network. The main rule governing the state transitions within inhibition nets is: a node n is excited if and only if (i) it is directly excited by the input, or (ii) there is an excitatory connection e from a further node m to n such that m is itself active and e is not inhibited by yet another active node which is inhibitorily connected to e. Thus the nodes which are connected inhibitorily to excitatory lines have a function similar to undercutting defeaters (Pollock [23] ) in defeasible logic, though on a completely different level of computation.
Put formally, the dynamics of inhibition nets is defined as such:
Definition 3.1. Let I = N, E, I, bias be an inhibition net. Let S = {s | s : N → {0, 1} with s(bias) = 1} be the space of states of the net I (we will generally omit the reference to I and just use the notation 'S' for the sake of simplicity).
Let s * ∈ S be an arbitrary state of I (the input): let F s * : S → S such that for all n ∈ N \ {bias}:
Then F s * is the state transition function given relative to the input s * and the net I (we will again omit the reference to I).
If s is a state of I and s(n) = 1, we say that n fires or that n is active (in s). A set of nodes is called 'active' if each of its members is active. From time to time we will identify a state (which is a function) with the set of neurons active in the very state: e.g., if we say that s 1 ⊆ s 2 we actually mean that for all n ∈ N : if s 1 
The 'if' direction of the clause for F s * above says that if a node is caused to fire, it indeed fires; on the other hand, the 'only if' direction states that a node should only fire if it is also caused to fire. The inhibition of an excitatory connection is always dominant over the simultaneous impulse within the very excitatory connection. Note that the bias node fires in every state s. The bias commits the net to a certain preferred state of minimal energy which the net always reaches in the case of lacking "stress" (= input). Such bias nodes are also employed in some of the usual neural networks.
For each s ∈ S (and each given input s * ∈ S) the iterated application of F s * defines the following trajectory of states: k s * (s) may be considered as the net state at time k given that s has been the initial state at time 0, and given an input s * , which is considered to be constant for a sufficient amount of time. S, F s * is a discrete dynamical system which is associated with the input s * and the net I. ( S, F s * ) s * ∈S is a family of discrete dynamical systems associated with I. Dynamical systems such as S, F s * are called 'discrete' since they evolve in discrete temporal steps of unit duration.
At time 0 the net is in a certain state s and an input s * is fed into the network. s * excites a certain set of nodes and consequently each of these nodes fires at time 1. Since the input is considered to be invariant for a sufficient temporal duration, this happens over and over again at each of the subsequent steps. Additionally, the bias node fires at each point of time. The "energy" emerging from the input and the bias node spreads from every step t to the subsequent step t + 1 via the excitatory connections, but only if these connections are not inhibited by the activity of further nodes at time t.
For example, consider I 1 : if n 1 is the only node that fires at time 0, n 2 is caused to fire at time 1, but if both n 1 and n 4 fire initially, then n 2 does not fire at the next step due to inhibition.
In Fig. 3 we have depicted the complete state transition diagram for the example network I 2 given the zero input state, i.e., no node is activated by the input (in the figure the triple x 1 , x 2 , x 3 is the state in which the node n i is in state x i for 1 i 3):
In the case of an FHIN the second part of the right hand side of the 'iff' clause in Definition 3.1 may be put into a different shape by the following remark: Remark 3. Let n ∈ N i (where I has the canonical partition N 0 , . . . , N k , as it will be assumed for the whole of this section): 
Proof.
(1) First we show existence: let s : N → {0, 1} be inductively defined such that In Table 1 we have listed the closure states for the example net I 1 . Stable (resonant) states play an excellent role in the literature on neural networks. Often they are considered to be the "answers" of neural networks to inputs (="questions"), and this is also our motivation for studying such states.
FHINs do not only possess unique stable states Cl(s * ) for all input s * , but the states of an FHIN may even be shown to finally converge to Cl(s * ) under the constant input s * where the selection of the initial state s is irrelevant: 
Proof. Straightforward by induction over indices i of the partition sets. ✷
Now we can specify what we have meant by qualifying an input as 'constant for a sufficient amount of time', as we have done in Section 1: if i > k where k is the number of layers of I, then F i s * (s) = Cl(s * ), i.e.: if the input is constant for more than k units of time, the net definitely converges to a stable state which is only dependent on the input. This also entails that the iterated application of F s * does not generate any cycles apart from the 
But, obviously, at least the following holds: 
As a kind of substitute for monotonicity the following two weakenings of monotonicity may be proven: 
Proof. Assume that s 1 ⊆ s 2 ⊆ Cl(s 1 ); by induction over the partition sets:
(
On the other hand if Cl(s 2 )(n) = 1 then necessarily s 2 (n) = 0 and thus ∃n 1 ∈ N u with
by inductive assumption and n / ∈ s 1 by indirect assumption from above; thus in this case we would have that Cl(s 1 )(n) = 0, which would contradict
If Cl were an operator on sets of formulas it would thus be called 'cumulative' according to common usage (see Makinson [18, p. 43] 
. Now by induction over the partition sets (within this proof summation of indices is understood modulo j + 1):
(1) Induction basis. Again by Remark 4 we have
; therefore, n would have to be a member of s r+1 . But since s r+1 ⊆ Cl(s r ), Cl(s r )(n) would be 1, contradicting Cl(s r )(n) = 0. Thus also Cl(s r+1 )(n) = 0 and by the same reasoning pattern Cl(s r )(n) = 0 for all r ∈ {0, . . ., j}. If Cl(s r )(n) = 1 for some r then there cannot be an r such that Cl(s r )(n) = 0, because otherwise we would get a contradiction by inferring that Cl(s r )(n) = 0, as before. So, Cl(s r )(n) = Cl(s r )(n) for r, r ∈ {0, . . ., j}. ✷ If Cl were an operator on sets of formulas it would therefore be called to satisfy 'Loop' (see KLM [14, p. 187 
]).
Although inhibition nets obey the very simple local activation rule stated in Definition 3.1, they may nevertheless be quite complex automata. This is indicated by the following two theorems: Theorem 3.8. Every Boolean mapping f : {0, 1} i → {0, 1} may be computed by an FHIN in the sense that there are i ("input") nodes n 1 , . . . , n i and one ("output") node n f in the network, such that for all
Proof. A (sub)net containing the three nodes bias, n, n ¬ , the excitatory edge bias, n ¬ , the inhibitory edge n, bias, n ¬ and which contains no other edges computes the truth value of the "negation" node n ¬ of n. A (sub)net containing the three nodes n 1 , n 2 , n ∨ , the excitatory edges n 1 , n ∨ and n 2 , n ∨ and which contains no other edges computes the truth value of the "disjunction" n ∨ of n 1 and n 2 . Here 'computation' is understood again in the following sense: if s * is given by a classical evaluation of n, or n 1 and n 2 , then F s * applied iteratively will obviously turn s * into a stable state in which n ¬ fires iff n does not fire, and in which n ∨ fires iff n 1 fires or n 2 fires. But since every propositional formula with i propositional variables is logically equivalent to a formula which has the same set of propositional variables but in which only the negation and the disjunction sign are used as logical connectives, every Boolean function f may be computed by composition of subnets isomorphic to those sketched before. ✷ Theorem 3.9.
1) Every finite inhibition net is a finite state machine. (2) Every finite state machine (FSM) may be simulated by a finite inhibition net (FIN) in the following sense: for every internal state q of the FSM there is a corresponding ("internal state") node n q in the FIN; for every input i of the FSM there is a corresponding ("input") node n i in the FIN; for every output o of the FSM there is a corresponding ("output") node n o in the FIN; if λ is the next-state function of the FSM, and δ is the next-output function of the FSM, there is a fixed natural number c, such that for arbitrary internal states q and inputs i of the FSM, it holds:
Proof. The first claim is a direct consequence of the definition of inhibition nets and the definition of finite state machines (see, e.g., Arbib [1, p. 8] ). The set of inputs and the set of outputs of a finite state machine may simply be identified with the state space S. The second claim is proven in the same way as it is shown that a McCulloch-Pitts net may simulate every finite state machine (see Rojas [25, pp. 47f] ). The only adaptation to be made is that McCulloch-Pitts nodes with threshold 2 have to be replaced by "conjunction nodes"-this is possible according to Theorem 3.8. c depends on the depth of the subnet that is used to compute Boolean conjunction. Where only input lines and output lines are used in [25] , we add the corresponding input nodes and output nodes. Of course, the representation of a finite state machine by a McCulloch-Pitts net or by an inhibition net is generally a notoriously inefficient one. ✷ Note that not every finite state machine can be simulated by an FHIN, since the latter are hierarchical, and thus they generally cannot simulate FSMs where the next-state function leads to loops in the internal state transition.
As a final remark on the dynamics of inhibition nets we want to justify the restriction to hierarchical inhibition nets by the simple fact that nonhierarchical inhibition nets violate the stability property (and therefore also the convergence property): Lemma 3.10.
( 
Call n in I the "Inhibition Truthteller". ✷ Lemma 3.10 does not imply that nonhierarchical inhibition nets are "defective" in any way. It just shows that they induce activity patterns in far more complicated ways than the hierarchical nets, since the latter exclude feedback. This gain of simplicity is one reason why we restrict ourselves to the study of FHINs within this paper. A second reason is that it is not so clear what we should count as the "answer" of a nonhierarchical net to an input since there is generally no single stable state or no stable state at all.
Inhibition nets as cognitive agents
We have advertized inhibition nets in the beginning as kinds of formal imitations of biological "brainware", though on a very high level of abstraction. But brains are (among others) cognitive agents. In this section we are looking for an analogous assessment of inhibition nets as being cognitive.
We consider a cognitive agent to be a dynamical system (i) the states of which are (identified with) states of belief, and (ii) the state transitions of which are (identified with) inferences. We choose a ternary belief predicate of agents, states and sentences in order to ascribe beliefs to agents in a certain state. Contents of belief are regarded as sentences. Alternatively, one may reinterpret 'the agent believes in the state s the sentence ϕ' by 'the agent believes in the state s the proposition expressed by the sentence ϕ'. Moreover, we will take the following assumption for granted: the cognitive agents considered in this paper are rational in various respects to be explained in the following sections. In particular, they are supposed to be rational concerning the classical consequences of their beliefs, i.e., if such an agent believes α in s and it also believes α → β in s, then it also believes β in s. Note that our cognitive agents will not have to draw any kind of inference in order to believe β in such a case, since they will "automatically" be in a state of believing β, whenever they are in a state in which they simultaneously believe α and α → β. There are three reasons for adopting this rationality assumption: first of all, we are primarily concerned with nonmonotonic reasoning in this paper and thus we do not want to struggle around with more complicated accounts of classical reasoning; secondly, our efforts may be viewed as the study of a certain normative ideal with which the more realistic models of cognition may be compared; finally, assumptions as the ones above are typically made whenever a standard account of doxastic or epistemic logic with operators is employed, and we decide to adopt this convention.
A further peculiarity of the beliefs we ascribe to inhibition nets is that they are idenfied with causally active patterns of excitation, and thus they are not dispositions as they are often supposed to be. The reason for this decision is that we think of the beliefs we consider as short-term perceptive beliefs about the current state of the environment, and also currently excited by external stimulation.
In order to ascribe beliefs to inhibition nets we use a sentential language L (the "factual" language) consisting of finitely many propositional variables and closed under the application of the standard logical connectives (¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔, , ⊥) in the usual manner. L neither contains quantifiers, nor any defeasible conditional, nor a nonstandard connective of a different kind. We use small Greek letters with or without indices as metavariables ranging over the formulas of L. A formula ϕ is used to ascribe to a net the belief that ϕ is the case. Since we do not consider beliefs of higher order in this paper we avoid introducing a belief operator or a belief predicate into the object language L itself.
Net states and belief states are considered to be associated in the following way:
Postulate for Belief States: a net agent believes ϕ in a state s iff the set I(ϕ) of nodes is active in s.
I(ϕ) is the pattern of activity associated with ϕ; if I = N, E, I, bias is the inhibition net considered, then I(ϕ) is a subset of N and we may always assume that bias ∈ I(ϕ) since the bias node fires anyway. We say that I(ϕ) is the (pattern) interpretation of ϕ, and I is the interpretation mapping. Whenever the pattern I(ϕ) is active in a net state, the net has a belief the content of which is ϕ. Since it is possible that I(ϕ) = I(ψ) although ϕ = ψ, one and the same pattern may be the interpretation of different sentences (in fact it may be shown from the postulates below that every pattern is the interpretation of infinitely many sentences). This is a form of distributed representation, i.e., the kind of representation intended to be characteristic of connectionist approaches to cognition. Its envisioned opponent is the strictly local form of representation by which each item (atomic or complex) is represented by the activity of a single node: e.g., your Grandma would be represented by the firing of a single "Grandmother neuron". This type of "one item-one node" representation would lead to a rather uneconomical cognitive system if employed universally. For more on the difference between distributed and local representation see, e.g., van Gelder [10] .
We demand the following
Postulates for I:
Note that it would suffice to postulate only [ (3 ):
The postulates are motivated in the following way:
Concerning (1): T H I is the set of formulas ϕ such that ϕ is believed by the net in every possible state (since I(ϕ) = {bias} ⊆ s for arbitrary s). E.g., if a net is to believe that penguins are birds without any exception, then penguin → bird should be contained in T H I , i.e., I(penguin → bird) should be identical to {bias}. Since we restrict ourselves to rational agents, the set T H I should be both consistent and deductively closed.
Concerning (2): if T H I ϕ → ψ the net believes ϕ → ψ in every state. Now suppose the net is in the state I(ϕ), i.e., all and only the nodes within I(ϕ) fire; in this case the net also believes ϕ. According to the rationality assumption the net agent should also believe ψ in this case, but according to the way we associate net states with belief states this entails that I(ϕ) ⊇ I(ψ). We forgo to postulate also the direction from the right to the left, i.e., [if I(ϕ) ⊇ I(ψ) then also T H I ϕ → ψ] since this will have some technical advantages concerning the proof of the representation theorem in the next section. If T H I ϕ → ψ we say that ϕ implies ψ according to T H I , or that ϕ is stronger than ψ (ψ is weaker than ϕ) according to T H I . Analogously, if I(ϕ) ⊇ I(ψ) we say that ϕ implies ψ according to I, or that ϕ is stronger than ψ (ψ is weaker than ϕ) according to I.
Concerning (3): at first glance it may seem strange that the interpretation of a conjunction should be identical to the union of the component interpretations-generally, we are used to define it by the intersection of the component values. On the other hand, this postulate intuitively matches the interpretation of neurons as "elementary-feature detectors": suppose there are just two neurons n 1 and n 2 ; n 1 fires iff a red object has been detected, whereas n 2 fires iff a large object has been detected. If now a both red and large object has been detected, this will be the case if and only if both n 1 and n 2 fire, i.e., the set of firing neurons will be identical to the union of {bias, n 1 } and {bias, n 2 } and not to their intersection.
Concerning (4): this is a kind of "normalization" postulate; if one likes to get rid of it, one may simply replace 'N ' in the considerations below by 'I(⊥)'.
Concerning (5): bias fires in every state anyway. Although postulate (3) is intuitively supported by what we have just pointed out above, the restriction to Is satisfying this postulate is not as "innocent" as it may seem: e.g., say, in the example above there is an additional neuron n 3 which fires iff a red and large object has been observed. In this case n 3 neither necessarily fires when a red object has been detected, nor when a large object has been detected. Thus n 3 should be a member of I(red ∧ large), but n 3 should not be a member of I(red) ∪ I(large), or so it seems. But such a situation is excluded by postulate (3). So we should better deal in more detail with the consequences of our postulates regarding the interpretation of the patterns {bias, n}, which are the borderline cases of distributed representation (such patterns are sometimes even called 'local' although they should not be mixed up with the strictly local representation by nodes n: see van Gelder [10, p. 236 
]).
A partial hint is given by postulate (2): it says that the stronger a formula is (according to T H I or I), the larger its interpretation; or, put inversely: the weaker a formula is, the smaller its interpretation. For example, the falsum ⊥ implies every formula α since T H I ⊥ → α for all α ∈ L. Correspondingly, its interpretation is the largest possible image under I (which is by normalization identical to N ). On the other hand, the verum is implied by every formula α, since T H I α → for all α ∈ L, and thus its interpretation is the smallest possible one (= {bias}). Now suppose I(ϕ) = {bias, n}: in such a case ϕ is strictly stronger than according to T H I and thus also according to I, since T H I ϕ → , but T H I → ϕ, because otherwise also T H I ϕ and I(ϕ) = {bias} = {bias, n}; moreoever, there is no ψ such that ψ is both strictly stronger than and strictly weaker than ϕ according to T H I , since in this case we would have {bias} = I( ) I(ψ) I(ϕ) = {bias, n}, which is impossible. Therefore the pattern {bias, n} corresponds to a "basic" state of belief having a content of minimal strength (a "microfeature") except for the beliefs the agent has in every possible state. All states of belief having stronger contents than such minimal ones are superpositions of minimal belief patterns. For example, if I(ϕ) = {bias, n 1 }, and I(ψ) = {bias, n 2 }, then I(ϕ ∧ ψ) = {bias, n 1 , n 2 } by postulate (3), and there is no pattern {bias, n} having ϕ ∧ ψ as its content. This is the kind of assumption that is implicitly contained in our postulates (1)-(4).
If we combine the notion of a net with that of an interpretation we get the notion of an interpreted network, which is the cornerstone of all of our further investigations: Interpreted networks are (formal models of) cognitive agents which are built from inhibition nets. We have added the further constraint that Cl({bias}) N since otherwise for every state s Lemma 3.6 would entail that Cl(s) = N , since {bias} ⊆ s ⊆ N = Cl({bias}). In this case the cognitive activity generated by an interpreted network would trivially converge to a stable state identical to the interpretation of the logical falsum, i.e., such an agent would always finally believe a contradiction, which would contradict our rationality assumption.
A partially interpreted (inhibition) network is defined analogously to Definition 4.1 with the minor difference that there is a distinguished subset N of N such that Cl({bias}) N , I : L → ℘ (N), and I(⊥) = N . In this case the nodes contained in N \ N may be used as auxiliary "inter-neurons" without any representational function. It is easy to see that all of the results stated below would also turn out to be true if we decided to use partially interpreted networks instead of totally interpreted ones. We opt for the latter just for the sake of simplicity. It is only in the Sections 6 and 7 that we will refer to partially interpreted networks.
Definition 4.1 directly entails:
and postulate (2)).
• (N \ I(ϕ)) ∪ {bias} ⊆ I(¬ϕ) (because of the previous line).
• I( ) = {bias}.
• If T H I ϕ ↔ ψ then I(ϕ) = I(ψ) (because of postulate (2)). Thus, e.g.,
From a neurophysiological point of view it may again seem strange to assume that the activity pattern associated with believing ¬ϕ has to be a superset of the complement of the pattern associated with believing ϕ, as it is stated by the third line of the last corollary. However, this fact is just another consequence of the assumption that beliefs are the superpositions of basic beliefs. Of course we do not claim that this assumption holds for every single part of a biological or artificial brain, but it might nevertheless be an economical way of representation which could be employed in certain substructures. Example 4.3. Let N = {bias, n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 }, let L be built up from the propositional variables red and large, and let us assume that
So, e.g., n 1 fires iff the agent believes that there is some object right in front of him which is either red and large, or red and not large, or not red and large. The only possibility excluded is the combination of being not red and not large. Analogously for the nodes n 2 , n 3 , n 4 . The patterns {bias, n i } for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the basic patterns having minimal content except for the pattern only containing the bias node, which corresponds to the belief that there is anything there without any further qualification (thus this belief is always true). Intuitively, if a red object is detected, the nodes bias, n 1 , n 2 should fire simultaneously, while if an object is detected which is not red, the nodes bias, n 2 , n 4 should fire. If I is an interpretation mapping we can indeed derive that I(red) = {bias, n 1 , n 2 }, I(large) = {bias, n 1 , n 3 }, I(¬red) = {bias, n 3 , n 4 }, I(¬large) = {bias, n 2 , n 4 }. The latter patterns are superpositions of the basic patterns given above. In this case the pattern associated with believing ¬red is identical to complement of the pattern associated with believing red, if we disregard the bias node, and analogously for ¬large and large.
Since interpretation mappings generally lack inductive clauses for negation and disjunction, not every such mapping may be defined by fixing the interpretation of the propositional variables and extending the interpretation recursively to the complex factual formulas. Thus one may ask how difficult it is in general to construct such interpretation mappings. The answer is that such a construction may be achieved easily by means of assigning sets of worlds to nodes. By a world we mean a truth value assignment for the propositional variables in L. Satisfaction by worlds is defined just as usual.
The next definition shows the method of construction:
n |≡ ϕ} (where we use the satisfaction relation |≡ defined in Definition A.6 of Appendix A for states in cumulative-ordered models relative to a labelling l; thus the satisfaction relation is actually dependent on the choice of l).
l[I](n) cannot be empty for since {ϕ ∈ L | n / ∈ I(ϕ)} is a consistent theory; l[I](bias) is identical to W . Note that both I[l] and l[I]
are defined by negated clauses. This is due to the definition of interpretation mappings by which the classical connectives are interpreted dually to their standard interpretation in possible worlds semantics (e.g., conjunctions are given by unions of interpretations, the verum is given by the least image under I, etc.).
Theorem 4.5. Let I : L → ℘ (N) be an interpretation, l : N \ {bias} → ℘ (W) \ {∅} a labelling:
1) I[l] is an interpretation. (2) l[I] is a labelling. (3) I[l[I]] = I, l[I[l]] = l.
Proof. The proof is not difficult and left to the reader. Only standard reasoning in classical propositional logic for a language with finitely many propositional variables is needed. ✷
As we have seen, labelling functions may be used to define interpretation mappings in a neat way. But the net semantics as such does not presuppose a possible worlds semantics in any way. Example 4.6. Let N = {bias, n 1 , n 2 }; let L be based on just two propositional variables p and q; let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 } be the set of possible worlds for L, such that w 1 |= p ∧ q, w 2 |= p ∧¬q, w 3 |= ¬p ∧q, w 4 |= ¬p ∧¬q. Let l : N \{bias} → ℘ (W)\{∅} be a labelling of N , such that l(n 1 ) = {w 1 , w 2 }, and l(n 2 ) = {w 1 , w 3 }. Thus, e.g., n 1 |≡ p, but neither n 1 |≡ q, nor n 1 |≡ ¬q; n 2 |≡ q, but neither n 2 |≡ p, nor n 2 |≡ ¬p.
It follows that, e.g.,
[l](q) = {bias} ∪ n ∈ N \ {bias} | not: n |≡ q = {bias, n 1 },
It is easy to see that
and that also
Now let us return to the association of net states and belief states, which we have stated informally in Section 2. It may be put precisely as such: 
Remark 5. It follows that • (Bel(N, s, ϕ) and Bel(N, s, ψ)) iff
These are conditions we usually expect a belief predicate to satisfy. Apart from belief simpliciter we can also introduce the concept of a total belief expressed by an all-the-agent-believes predicate in the style of Levesque [15] : • (N, s, ϕ) and ψ is strictly stronger than ϕ (according to T H I or I), then ¬Bel(N, s, ψ), (N, s, ϕ) and Bel (N, s, ψ) , then ψ is weaker than ϕ according to I (but not necessarily according to T H I ).
In order to check whether it is the case that AllBel (N, s, ϕ) , it is necessary to consider N's total current state s; in order to check whether Bel (N, s, ϕ) , it is generally sufficient to look for certain substates of s. Now let us turn to the dynamic aspects of cognition. At a time t an interpreted network N may be exhibit certain activities called 'inferences'. We regard inferences as (i) being caused by an input which makes N believe that a certain set of premises holds, and (ii) having a final equilibrium state (a "reflective" equilibrium), in which N believes that a certain set of conclusions holds. The final state of an inference is thus identical to the closure of its input state, i.e., the stable state into which the current net state is transformed under the given input according to the dynamics of the network. We may think of the closure state as a plausible hypothesis generated by the agent in light of the evidence given by the input. In the next section we will show that the inferences which interpreted inhibition nets are disposed to draw are always closed under the rules of a well-known system of nonmonotonic logic. In order to demonstrate this it is first necessary to describe qualitatively, i.e., in nonnumerical terms, which inferences an inhibition net is actually disposed to draw. This may be done by the means of conditionals α ⇒ β, which are descriptive sentences stating that the agent N is disposed to draw a nonmonotonic inference such that (i) the input of the inference is s * , (ii) if s * were N's actual state then all that N would believe would be α, and (iii) the inference converges to the stable state Cl(s * ), in which N believes β. Put shortly we might say: α ⇒ β states that N is disposed to draw the nonmonotonic inference from the total belief of α to the final belief of β. But, in a sense, this latter reading of the conditional α ⇒ β does not exactly render what is actually going on while such an inference is drawn: on the one hand the consequent of α ⇒ β is certainly a correct description of what N believes at the final state of such an inference, since by assumption N indeed believes β in Cl(s * ). But on the other hand the fact that the input s * is identical to I(α) by assumption does not necessarily entail that N is actually in the state s * at time 0 or later, since N may initially be in virtually any state only depending on N's "cognitive past". However, after one iteration of the transition function F s * N at least believes α, and due to the convergence property this belief is the only one which is causally active concerning the long-time behaviour of the network. Alternatively, we might imagine that all of the activities of nodes are erased before a new inference is initiated, and that the initial state of an inference is set to the input state s * = I(α), in which all that N believes is indeed α. Now let us put this into formal terms: let L ⇒ (the "conditional" language) be the set of conditionals α ⇒ β, where α, β ∈ L. We do not allow any nestings of ⇒, nor any concatenations of factual formulas and conditionals. Definition 4.9. Let N = I, L, I be an interpreted network:
For α ⇒ β ∈ L ⇒ we say that
The last definition has the following equivalent (re-)formulations:
Remark 7. N |= α ⇒ β iff Bel(N, Cl(I(α)), β) iff I(β) ⊆ Cl(I(α)).
A clause similar to the last one of Remark 7 is used by Gärdenfors [8, p. 63] , in order to introduce nonmonotonic inferences to neural networks. The only minor difference is that Gärdenfors does not interpret object languages by patterns, but instead he talks about the patterns in the metalanguage without making use of an object language at all. An agent's disposition to draw a nonmonotonic inference from the total belief of α to the final belief of β may itself be termed a "belief", but now this is a conditional belief of higher order compared to the level of the factual beliefs considered above. The content of such a belief could be identified with the objective conditional stating that the normal α-situations are also β-situations. Conditional beliefs are not represented in the network by patterns of activity but by the topology of the network. Such a way of coding, however, is again a distributed kind of representation.
Using Definition 4.9 we can associate theories of conditionals with interpreted networks:
is the conditional theory corresponding to N.
T H ⇒ (N)
is the total description of the set of nonmonotonic inferences N is disposed to draw. Calling T H ⇒ (N) a conditional theory will be justified by Lemma 5.2 in the next section.
The following definitions are in perfect analogy to the introduction of the usual semantical notions to the semantics of classical logic: Definition 4.11.
(1) α ⇒ β is called valid iff for every interpreted network N:
We say that N |= KB iff for every ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ KB it holds that N |= ϕ ⇒ ψ.
We say that
We loosely refer to the notions defined in this section by the term 'net semantics' (or more precisely: 'net semantics for FHINs').
Example 4.12. Let I 1 be as defined above, L 1 is built from the propositional variables b ("bird"), f ("flyer"), w ("wings"), p ("penguin"), and I 1 (b) = {bias, n 1 },
It is easy to see that I 1 is an interpretation mapping and thus
The definitions of Bel and AllBel, e.g., entail that
From the definition of |= it follows that
Thus, e.g., if all that N 1 initially believes is b (see Fig. 4 ), then N 1 finally believes f ∧ w (see Fig. 5 ). Moreover, if all that N 1 initially believes is b ∧ p (see Fig. 6 ), then N 1 finally believes ¬f ∧ w (see Fig. 7 ). Now suppose we extended E 1 by bias, n 1 : then it would also follow that N 1 |= { ⇒ b, ⇒ f ∧ w, . . .}, i.e., if all that I 1 believed was that "there is something", i.e., if it had no information at all, it would automatically infer "there is a bird, which is able to fly and has got wings", which might be plausible if, e.g., I 1 were itself a bird living in a cage only Fig. 4. AllBel(N 1 , {bias, n 1 }, b) . populated by other (normal) birds. Thus, on the cognitive level, the role of the bias node is to enable plausible nonmonotonic inferences from zero beliefs.
There is a variety of further interesting connectives and notions, which may be defined in order to describe the cognitive properties of interpreted nets. However, for the rest of the paper we will restrict ourselves only to the study of the defeasible conditional ⇒ and of the notion of implication defined for sets of such conditionals. We postpone the study of other connectives and further useful semantical or cognitive concepts to another paper.
The representation theorem

The soundness lemma
In this section we will have a look at what the correct rules of inference are for ⇒. Such rules will be closure properties of the following prototypical form: if a conditional so and so is true in an interpreted net, and furthermore a conditional so and so is true in the same net, then also the conditional so and so is true in this net. The closure properties satisfied by our nets will be proven to be those of the system CL of cumulative reasoning with Loop (see KLM [14, pp. 186-189] ). The system CL is summarized in Appendix A, where also the notion of a conditional theory and all other notions are introduced which will be applied in this section. A conditional theory is a set of conditionals (i) which is closed under the rules of CL, (ii) such that a given classical theory T H is extended by the conditional theory. For example, if α → β is contained in T H, then α ⇒ β is contained in every conditional theory extending T H. Intuitively, T H contains the "hard" laws, like, e.g., '(All) penguins are birds' as opposed to the "soft" laws like 'Birds can normally fly'. CL is shown by KLM to have a nice normal-states semantics by which a model makes a conditional α ⇒ β true iff the most normal states satisfying α also satisfy β. We will prove that CL also has a net semantics.
For the proof of the soundness result we need another lemma first: 
Since by assumption it holds that I(α) ⊇ I(β) according to postulate (2) for I and therefore
Because we know from Lemma 5.
that by assumption Cl(I(α)) = Cl(I(α ∧ β)).
But also by assumption it holds that I(γ ) ⊆ Cl(I(α ∧ β)) and we are done.
For again by assumption and by Lemma 5.1 we have that Cl(I(α)) = Cl(I(α ∧ β)); but by assumption we also know that I(γ ) ⊆ Cl(I(α)), and we are done again. (6) Loop: Suppose that N |= α i ⇒ α i+1 for i = 0, . . . , j (again addition is understood modulo j + 1); in this case we have The next lemma says that the theories defined by inhibition nets are not sound relative to the well-known system P of preferential reasoning, which is stronger than CL:
and I(α 0 ) ⊆ Cl(I(α j )). By Lemma 3.7 it follows that Cl(I(α 0 )) = · · · = Cl(I(α j )) and thus by Remark 4, I(α r ) ⊆ Cl(I(α r )) = Cl(I(α r )). T H ⇒ (N) is consistent, since Cl(I(
)
Lemma 5.4. T H ⇒ (N) is not necessarily closed under
Proof. As a counterexample consider N = {bias, n 1 , n 2 , n 3 } such that E = { n 1 , n 3 , n 2 , n 3 }, I = ∅; then {n 3 } ⊆ Cl({n 1 }), {n 3 } ⊆ Cl({n 2 }), but {n 3 } Cl({n 1 } ∩ {n 2 }) = Cl(∅). Add a corresponding interpretation. ✷
Lemma 5.5. T H ⇒ (N) is not necessarily closed under Contraposition.
Proof. Consider N = {bias, n 1 , n 2 } such that E = { n 1 , n 2 }, I = ∅; in this case {bias,
Again add a corresponding interpretation. ✷
The trivial counterexamples to Or and Contraposition show that the invalidness of the latter rules has nothing to do with the presence of inhibition but that it is rather a consequence of the definition of the net semantics as such. It is also easy to see that the Rational Monotonicity rule is not generally satisfied by interpreted nets.
The Completeness Lemma
Now we prove a result (roughly) analogous to a version of the completeness theorem for classical logic which states that every consistent theory has a model:
Lemma 5.6 (Completeness I). Let T H ⊆ L be a theory, i.e., deductively closed: for every consistent conditional theory T H ⇒ ⊆ L ⇒ extending T H there is an interpreted network N = I, L, I such that
• T H I ⊇ T H, and
Proof. By Theorem A.7 stated in Appendix A (and proven by KLM [14, pp. 188-189]) for every T H ⇒ as above there is a finite cumulative-ordered model
, all states minimal with respect to ≺, which make α true, also make β true. In the following we use M to construct the intended interpreted network N. We use 's' with or without index to range over states in the sense of cumulativeordered models, and 's' as usual to range over net states. Let N = {bias} ∪S. Let E = { bias,s |s is not minimal according to ≺} ∪ { s,s | s ≺s }. For everys ∈S let Ls = {s ∈S |s ≺s}; say, Ls = {s 1 , . . . ,s r s }. Now we define Is = { bias, s 1 ,s , s 1 , s 2 ,s , . . . , s r s −1 , s r s ,s , s r s , bias,s }. Ifs is minimal in ≺, then let Is = ∅. Let I = s∈S Is . Obviously, I ⊆ N × E. Since I = N, E, I, bias does not contain any cycles, and since I is finite (becauseS is), I is an FHIN.
We define for ϕ ∈ L: I(ϕ) = {s |s does not make ϕ true}. Obviously, I is an interpretation mapping. Let N = I, L, I . N is an interpreted network. Now we show that M |= α ⇒ β iff N |= α ⇒ β, which immediately entails:
Let α ∈ L. We will prove by induction thats ∈S does not fire in the net state Cl(I(α)) iffs is a minimal α-state according to M. Let N 0 , . . . , N k be the canonical partition of I as usual.
• Induction basis: Lets ∈ N 0 (s = bias sinces ∈S). Cl(I(α))(s) = 0 iffs / ∈ I(α) iffs is an α-state. Moreover, every states in N 0 is minimal according to ≺ by definition of E and I .
• Induction step: Assume that for everys ∈ N 0 ∪ · · · ∪ N i : Cl(I(α))(s) = 0 iffs is a minimal α-state. Now consider an arbitrarys ∈ N i+1 : Cl(I(α))(s) = 0 iffs / ∈ I(α) and ¬∃m ∈ N j with j < i such that (Cl (I(α) )(m) = 1, m Es, ¬∃m ∈ N u with u < i(Cl (I(α))(m ) = 1, m I m,s ) ). But this is the case if and only ifs is a minimal α-state, for the following reasons: first,s / ∈ I(α) iffs is an α-state; at second, by definition of E and I , ¬∃m ∈ N j such that j < i and Cl(I(α))(m) = 1, m Es, ¬∃m ∈ N u with u < i such that (Cl(I(α))(m ) = 1, m I m,s ) iff ∀s ∈ Ls it holds that Cl(I(α))(s ) = 1 iff (by induction hypothesis) ∀s ∈ Ls it holds thats is no minimal α-state. Buts is an α-state and ∀s ∈ Ls (s is no minimal α-state) iffs is a minimal α-state (by the Smoothness Condition). Therefore, we have that Cl(I(α))(s) = 0 iffs is a minimal α-state.
We know that M |= α ⇒ β iff all minimal α-states are β-states. But the latter is the case, if and only if for alls ∈S: if Cl(I(α))(s) = 0 thens / ∈ I(β), or equivalently, for alls ∈S:
If we take soundness and completeness together we get the following representation theorem:
Theorem 5.7 (Representation). Let T H ⊆ L be a theory: T H ⇒ ⊆ L ⇒ is a consistent conditional theory extending T H iff there is an interpreted network N = I, L, I such that T H I ⊇ T H, and T H ⇒ = T H ⇒ (N).
Proof. Lemma 5.2 proves the direction from the right to the left, Lemma 5.6 proves the direction from the left to the right. ✷ Apart from the versions of soundness/completeness given above there are several useful reformulations and consequences:
is true in all interpreted networks such that T H I ⊇ T H iff for all consistent conditional theories T H
⇒ extending T H: α ⇒ β ∈ T H ⇒ . (2) α ⇒ β is valid iff for all consistent conditional theories T H ⇒ extending the ded. closure dc({ }) of { }: α ⇒ β ∈ T H ⇒ . (3) (Soundness/Completeness II) α ⇒ β is valid iff α ⇒ β is provable (rel. to dc({ })). (4) KB |= α ⇒ β iff for all consistent conditional theories T H ⇒ ⊇ KB such that T H ⇒ extends dc({ }): α ⇒ β ∈ T H ⇒ . (5) (Soundness/Completeness III) KB |= α ⇒ β iff KB dc({ }) α ⇒ β.
Proof.
(1) Apply Theorem 5.7. 
, and therefore N |= α ⇒ β. ✷
Inhibition nets and other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning
There are various connections between inhibition nets and other mechanisms of nonmonotonic reasoning. We will again restrict ourselves to finite, hierarchical inhibition nets.
Let us begin with logic programs. In Appendix B one can find the basic definitions and standard results for the blossoming field of logic programming, as far as we need them in this section. By means of the following two definitions we will show how to associate finite hierarchical inhibition nets with logic programs of a certain important type, and vice versa. First of all, given an FHIN we can construct a "counterpart program" in which excitatory connections are simulated by rules with positive bodies, and in which inhibitory connections are replaced by negation as failure. Input states will be transformed into bodyless rules: Definition 6.1. Let I = N, E, I, bias be an FHIN: the program Π(I) associated with I is defined in the following way: (1) use N as the set P of propositional variables (but if there is no edge from bias to some other node or edge, simply drop bias); (2) for each n ∈ N add all rules of the form n ← n , not n 1 , . . . , not n j , where
• n E n,
• for all i with 1 i j : n i I n , n , • for all n ∈ N : if n I n , n then ∃i with 1 i j such that n = n i . (3) do not add any further rules. Let s * ∈ S; the program Π(I, s * ) associated with the net I and the input s * is defined as follows:
(1) use N as the set P of propositional variables (but, again, if there is no edge from bias to some other node or edge drop bias); (2) add all rules contained in Π(I); (3) add all bodyless rules with head n iff s * (n) = 1; (4) do not add any further rules.
The next definition shows how to simulate any given finite, normal, hierarchical logic program by means of an inhibition net in which conjunction nodes replace the positive parts of rule bodies, and in which inhibition lines replace negation as failure. Recall from Theorem 3.8 that we can always construct a conjunction node n 1 ∧ · · · ∧ n i of nodes n 1 , . . . , n i (if i = 1 then we regard n 1 as a "conjunction" node); for the construction we have to add a subnet of auxiliary inter-nodes. The input associated with a program will be set to the class of heads of its bodyless rules: Definition 6.2. Let Π be a finite, normal, and hierarchical program (allowing for negation as failure) based on a set P of propositional variables: the inhibition net I(Π) = N Π , E Π , I Π , bias Π associated with Π is given as follows:
(1) N Π = P ∪ {bias Π } ∪ the set of auxiliary nodes needed for the construction of conjunction nodes; bias Π is some object not contained in P , (2) for all n, n 1 , . . . , n i+j ∈ N: (n 1 ∧ · · · ∧ n i ) E Π n iff there is a rule n ← n 1 , . . . , n i , not n i+1 , . . . , not n i+j in Π , (3) for all n, n , n 1 , . . . , n i , n i+2 , . . . , n i+j ∈ N: n I (n 1 ∧ · · · ∧ n i ), n iff there is a rule n ← n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n i , not n , not n i+2 , . . . , not n i+j in Π . The input s * (Π) associated with Π is defined as {bias Π } joined with the set of all propositional variables n such that n is contained in Π as a bodyless rule.
Note that I(Π) has more nodes than Π has propositional variables. The following theorem proves the two definitions above to be sound and compatible: (3) and (4) capture what we mean when we say that finite, normal, hierarchical logic programs and FHINs are equivalent concerning their dynamics. An analogous theorem may be stated for finite normal hierarchical basic programs and inhibition nets without inhibitory connections.
By Theorem 6.3 logic programs (e.g., implemented as Prolog programs) may be used to generate the closures of input states of FHINs. Furthermore, all of the notions and results on inhibition nets presented above may be applied to finite, normal, and hierarchical logic programs, and also vice versa. For example, it is well known that answer sets for finite normal programs are minimal models of the translation of the programs into the language of classical logic, and that the classical interpretations which are closed under and supported by a logic program are precisely those interpretations which satisfy the completion of the program (see Lifschitz [16, pp. 106-107] ), and so forth. These results are now also applicable to inhibition nets.
In analogy to (partially) interpreted inhibition nets we can also speak of a (partially) interpreted finite, normal, and hierarchical logic program, which may be defined in the manner of Definition 4.1. By Theorem 6.3 also interpreted logic programs and interpreted inhibition nets are intertranslatable, where we use the interpretation mapping of the given interpreted program or network as the interpretation mapping of the intended translation of the given interpreted program or network. But note that the transition from an interpreted logic program to an interpreted inhibition net in the way of Definition 6.2 will actually result in a partially interpreted inhibition net, since the nodes which have to be added in order to get a corresponding inhibition net are actually not contained within the images of the interpretation mapping of the given interpreted logic program.
Inhibition nets may also be considered as default theories (Reiter [24] ) of a certain restricted kind. Here we can again apply a result for logic programs: see the end of Appendix B for a translation of logic programs into default theories. Using Theorem 6.1 we can thus also translate inhibition nets into default theories. By Proposition B.13 the deductive closures of answer sets are identical to the extensions of the translated logic programs. By Theorem 6.3 this also holds for the closures of the translated inhibition nets with an input. The well known translations from default logic to autoepistemic logic (e.g., Konolige [13] ) are therefore as well applicable to inhibition nets. Moreover, Marek and Truszczyński [19, pp. 374-376] , directly translate logic programs into sets of formulas of autoepistemic logic, and also this result may be used to translate inhibition net reasoning into autoepistemic reasoning.
Similar to the transformation of inhibition nets into logic programs and vice versa, we can also mutually translate inhibition nets into truth maintenance systems (Doyle [6] ) presented in a more abstract setting as nonmonotonic formal systems (Brewka [4, ) or nonmonotonic rule systems (Marek and Truszczyński [19, ). The rules of such systems have the prototypical form 'IF a 1 , . . . , a n UNLESS b 1 , . . . , b n THEN c' analogous to the normal rules in logic programs.
Various other nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms do not seem to have to do much with inhibition nets, although they are also based on directed acyclic graphs: e.g., inheritance nets, which lack inhibition, while inhibition nets lack negative paths.
After pointing out the similarities between inhibition nets and some kinds of nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms we should now turn to the differences. A superficial difference is that we have partially employed abstract imitations of the concepts used in dynamical systems theory and connectionism, where nonmonotonic reasoning usually presupposes the language and the concepts of classical AI. But the essential distinction between interpreted nets and the other approaches lies on the interpretative level, i.e., on the level where some kind of meaning is assigned to entities like nodes, or to the processes acting upon these entities. The main idea used in logic programming, default reasoning, and truth maintenance systems is (i) to assign meaning to the very entities (nodes ≈ propositional variables) which are used as the constituents of the local rules governing the nonmonotonic inference process, and (ii) to assign meaning to the local rules themselves in some way. For example, we might implement a logic program using the propositional variables b, p, f and the single rule f ← b, not p. The entities having representational function are the propositional variables b, p, f standing for birds, penguins, and flyers respectively, and the local rule f ← b, not p by which birds are believed to be flyers as long as they are not believed to be penguins. The propositional variables which are subject to this local rule are thus also interpreted. On the other hand this is not true for interpreted inhibition nets: while the entities which represent are the patterns of activity, the entities subject to local activation rules are the nodes in a network. Edges are not interpreted at all in the case of inhibition nets, and generally it will even be impossible to read any content into a single connection. Finally, note that in logic programs propositional variables are used as nodes, whereas in interpreted networks propositional variables are interpreted as sets of nodes.
Furthermore, all of the approaches cited in this section belong to the family of consistency-/fixed point based systems of nonmonotonic reasoning as opposed to the preference-based systems (for more on this vague but useful distinction see, e.g., Brewka et al. [5] ). The former family shares a reluctance to cumulativity, which the latter is inclined to. In some way interpreted inhibition nets seem to bridge the gap between the two rivalling families: on the local level, i.e., on the level of nodes and edges, they are quite similar to the consistency-based approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning as the translations from above show us. But on the global level of patterns and beliefs ascriptions they behave like preference-based systems as it has been proven by the representation theorem of the last section (other bridges between the two families have been drawn, e.g., by Brewka [3] ).
Inhibition nets and artificial neural networks
An artificial neural network (ANN) with a distinguished external input may be considered as a tuple U, W, A, O, NET, ex having the following properties (this is the definition stated by Nauck et al. [21, pp. 19-24] , where also a general overview of ANNs is to be found):
(1) U is a finite and nonempty set of units.
(2) W : U × U → R is the pattern of (weight-) connectivity, which assigns a weight to each edge between units. (3) A is a function which maps each unit u ∈ U to an activation mapping A u : R 3 → R such that the activation state a u (t + 1) of u at time t + 1 is dependent on the previous activation state a u (t) of u, the current net input net u (t + 1) of u, and the (constant) external input ex(u) fed into u, i.e.,
(4) O is a function which maps each unit u ∈ U to an output mapping O u : R → R such that the output state o u (t + 1) of u at time t + 1 is solely dependent on the activation state a u (t + 1) of u, i.e., o u (t + 1) = O u (a u (t + 1)). (5) NET is a function mapping every unit u ∈ U to a net input (or propagation) mapping NET u : (R × R) U → R such that the net input net u (t + 1) of u at time t + 1 depends on the weights of the edges leading from units u to u, and on the previous output states of the units u , i.e., net u (t + 1) = NET u (λu . W (u , u) , o u (t) ). (6) ex : U → R is the external input function, which we assume to be constant. Often, (i) W is defined the way that the set of edges having nonzero weight corresponds to a directed acyclic graph, and (ii) A u only depends on the net input and/or the external input, i.e., A u :
. If an ANN satisfies (i) we call it 'layered', if it satisfies (ii) we call it 'input-driven'. Let us furthermore call an ANN 'binary', if for every u ∈ U : O u is a mapping from R to {0, 1}, ex(u) ∈ {0, 1}, and if ex(u) = 1 then also o u (t + 1) = 1 (for t 0).
An ANN is a dynamical system transforming an initial network state under the influence of the external input. We only consider ANNs defined on a discrete time scale. Moreover, we assume the initial state of an ANN to be given by the output states o u (0) for arbitrary u ∈ U . More usually, the initial net state is given by the activity states a u (0), but for our purposes the output states are more adequate. Now we will show correspondence results for a class of ANNs and the class of FHINs. We avoid stating the formal details of how to explicitly construct an FHIN from a given ANN, and vice versa, since the technicalities are rather awkward. Instead, we will only sketch the constructions: Proof. All units of the given ANN are also used as nodes in the FHIN to be constructed. The only observation we need for the construction is that (i) if the external input to a unit in the ANN is 1, its output state is also set to 1, and (ii) if the external input to a unit in the ANN is 0, the output state of the unit is the image of a Boolean mapping the arguments of which are the outputs states of other units. This is the case because we have presupposed the ANN to be binary. By Theorem 3.8 we may thus replace the weighted edges leading to an arbitrary unit u ∈ U by an inhibition subnetwork computing the very Boolean mapping that is associated with u in the case of lacking external input. In order to do so we may have to add nodes, but this does not matter. Since the given ANN is supposed to be layered, the resulting inhibition net is hierarchical, and thus an FHIN. The external input function corresponds to an input state, the initial output state to an initial state in the FHIN. Therefore the given ANN and its associate FHIN have the same closure of the input. In general, the so-constructed FHIN has more nodes than the given ANN. ✷ By Theorem 7.1 every result on inhibition nets in Sections 2 and 3 is applicable to binary, layered, and input-driven ANNs. Now for the other direction: Proof. All nodes of the given FHIN are also used as units in the ANN to be constructed. The inhibition of edges employed in inhibition nets may be simulated by the inhibition of inter-nodes in ANNs: for each inhibitory line n 1 , n 2 , n 3 in the given FHIN add a further inter-node n in the ANN, replace n 1 , n 2 , n 3 by the inhibitory line n 1 , n having the negative weigth −1, while simultaneously replacing the excitatory connection n 2 , n 3 in the FHIN by two excitatory lines n 2 , n and n, n 3 both having positive weight 1. All other excitatory connections in the FHIN are replaced by connections with positive weight 1. For each unit we choose weighted summation as the net input mapping, the external input is identified with the (arbitrarily) given input state, and we set the activation mapping of each unit to a threshold function such that the activation state of the unit is 1, if the external input to the unit is 1 or the net input of the unit is larger than 0. For every unit we define the output mapping to be the identity function. Since the states of nodes in an FHIN are binary, and since FHINs are hierarchical, we get a binary, layered, and inputdriven ANN having the same closure of the input state as the given FHIN. The resulting ANN has generally more nodes than the FHIN. ✷ Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 state that FHINs and binary, layered, input-driven ANNs are indistinguishable concerning their dynamics. In analogy to (partially) interpreted inhibition nets we can speak of a (partially) interpreted binary, layered, and input-driven ANN, which may be defined in the way of Definition 4.1. By Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 also interpreted ANNs and interpreted inhibition nets are intertranslatable, by using the interpretation mapping of the given network as the interpretation mapping of the translation of the given network. But as the proof of Theorem 7.1 shows, the translation of an interpreted ANN into an interpreted inhibition net will generally result in a partially interpreted inhibition net, since the set of nodes may have to be enlarged. The same holds for the transition into the opposite direction (according to the proof of Theorem 7.2).
Every interpreted ANN with the properties from above again satisfies a conditional theory, and for every consistent conditional theory there is an interpreted ANN with such properties, which satisfies the theory. For this reason we may call CL sound and complete with respect to a net semantics for artificial neural networks of an important kind. If the weights of the edges of an interpreted ANN are altered by means of a learning mechanism, also the corresponding conditional theory is altered. In this way an interpreted ANN might learn a conditional theory, i.e., a set of conditional beliefs might be acquired by the network. The conditional beliefs of an interpreted ANN are represented by the weights of its connections.
The results of Sections 6 and 7 also show that finite, normal, hierarchical logic programs and binary, layered, input-driven ANNs are intertranslatable, as far as their closure dynamics is concerned.
Conclusions
It has been shown that the inferences that interpreted nets are disposed to draw may be described by theories of defeasible conditionals, where the very theories are closed under the rules of the system CL. Moreover, for every consistent theory of this kind there is an interpreted net having precisely the inferential dispositions stated by the theory. We suppose that these results may have consequences both for connectionist approaches to cognition and for the more classical AI approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning.
A first consequence of our results is that Smolensky's subsymbolic hypothesis on the connectionist paradigm seems to stand on shaky ground: if the subconceptual connectionist dynamical system is identical to an interpreted net, the hypothesis is provably false, as our results show. Of course, this failure may be due to the simplicity of inhibition nets compared to the complexity of real biological structures or to more elaborate artificial neural networks. But the contributions of Gärdenfors and Balkenius cited above and also the results of Section 7 seem to indicate that the subsymbolic hypothesis is as well questionable for the latter networks. Furthermore, Smolensky [30, p. 18] writes: "Formalizing knowledge in soft constraints rather than hard rules has important consequences. Hard constraints have consequences singly; they are rules that can be applied separately and sequentially-the operation of each proceeding independently of whatever other rules may exist. But soft constraints have no implications singly; any one can be overridden by the others. It is only the entire set of soft constraints that has any implications. Inference must be a cooperative process [. . .] . Furthermore, adding additional soft constraints can repeal conclusions that were formerly valid: Subsymbolic inference is fundamentally nonmonotonic." We agree with Gärdenfors [8, p. 69 ] that Smolensky is mistaken in speaking of 'inferences' on the subsymbolic level, since inferences are activities on the symbolic level. As far as interpreted nets are concerned this is indicated by the fact that the above quote comes out true if the talk of 'soft constraints' is replaced by the talk of 'defeasible conditionals' with the truth conditions stated in Definition 4.9.
Our results leave us with the opportunity to choose between (at least) four kinds of implementations for agents supposed to draw nonmonotonic inferences according to the rules of CL: the first one consists in defining a symbolic knowledge base for factual knowledge, a second one for default knowledge, and in implementing a computation unit which derives defeasible conditionals from the conditionals stored in the second knowledge base by means of CL. If the antecedent of such a derived conditional matches the conjunction of all the current entries in the factual knowledge base, the corresponding consequent may be inferred by default. The second kind of implementation consists in the construction of a finite hierarchical inhibition net. Factual knowledge is represented by activation patterns, which may be considered as the translations of symbolic representations by means of an interpretation mapping. The conclusions which are drawn are represented by closure states, which may be retranslated into factual formulas. The topology of the network may be described by a conditional theory, and a network might even be constructed according to a given conditional theory by applying Theorem 5.6. The third kind of implementation is by certain logic programs, the fourth one by certain artificial neural networks.
Either way that we implement such an agent, it is guaranteed that the agent is disposed to draw inferences which are closed under the laws of the system CL.
But this does not imply that the various kinds of implementations are exchangeable in every respect: e.g., an agent which uses a symbolic knowledge base is able to integrate a new conditional belief by simply adding another defeasible conditional to its knowledge base. In order to reach the same result a net agent may perhaps be forced to readjust the topology of the whole network. On the other hand, if the net agent has found a net topology subserving his inferential needs, it will perhaps be quicker in actually drawing inferences, although such questions of complexity have to be investigated separately in detail. A further advantage a symbolic agent has is that it is able to unfold the assumptions on which its inferences have been based, and how they have been derived. A net agent can only tell us about the trajectory of states which have led to his conclusions. Put shortly: each kind of implementation seems to have its shortcomings and virtues. The most important aspect of the investigations above is perhaps that we may switch from a symbolic implementation to a dynamic one and back if we want, and that we might also use a hybrid system consisting of different kinds of components.
Appendix A. Conditional theories and the system CL
In this appendix we will summarize the system CL of cumulativity with loop which has been introduced by KLM [14, pp. 187-189] . CL is stronger than the system C of pure cumulativity but weaker than the well-known system P of preferentiality. Contrary to KLM we develop CL in a strictly syntactical manner without making use of nonmonotonic consequence relations |∼. As a substitute for consequence relations we will introduce conditional theories, which are defined as sets of "soft" conditionals closed under the rules of CL while extending a given set T H of "hard" formulas. T H ⊆ L is a deductively closed set of propositional formulas. Most notions defined in this section will only be given relative to a theory T H. Actually, we should also relativize our notion of a conditional theory to the system CL in some way and rather speak of a CL-theory, but for simplicity and because we do not use any other system than CL in this paper, we say 'conditional theory' simpliciter.
4.
(4) Relative to a cumulative-ordered model M = S , l, ≺ we can define:
M |= α ⇒ β if the most normal states, among those which make α true, also make β true, i.e., ∀s ∈S (ifs is minimal inα, thens |≡ β). (5) Here we use:s is minimal inα iffs ∈α, ¬∃s ∈α:s ≺s. (6) The Smoothness Condition says that every state, which makes α true, is either itself most normal among the states which make α true, or there is a more normal state, which makes α true, which is also most normal; i.e., ∀α ∈ L, ∀s ∈S (s minimal inα, or ∃s ≺s (s minimal inα)).
Note that if L has only finitely many propositional variables then a model M based on L has only finitely many worlds.
KLM [14] show the following representation theorem (though stated in different terms):
Theorem A.7 (KLM [14, p. 189 
]). T H ⇒ ⊆ L ⇒ is a consistent conditional theory extending T H iff there is a cumulative-ordered model M based on the set W of worlds satisfying T H such that T H ⇒ = T H ⇒ (M).
Remark A.8. The consistency constraint on T H ⇒ seems to have been overlooked by KLM [14] .
Appendix B. Basics of logic programming
Let us briefly repeat some of the basic definitions to be found in the standard literature on logic programming. We will use the excellent introductory article by Lifschitz [16] , where all the notions and results given below are stated. A standard textbook reference on logic programming is Lloyd [17] . Definition B.1. Let P be a set of propositional variables (positive literals). Negative literals are negated propositional variables. Literals are positive or negative literals. Let Lit be the set of literals (given relative to P ). A rule element is a literal possibly preceded by the negation-as-failure symbol not. If X is a set of literals, let not(X) = {not n | n ∈ X}. X is inconsistent, if ∃n, ¬n ∈ X (consistent, otherwise). X is logically closed, if it is consistent or equal to Lit.
Definition B.2.
A rule is an ordered pair Head ← Body, whose first member Head is a literal, and whose second member Body is a (possibly empty) finite set of rule elements. A basic rule is a rule, whose body is a set of literals. A rule can be represented as Head ← Pos ∪ not(Neg) for some finite sets of literals Pos, Neg. The rule with the head n 0 and the body {n 1 , . . . , n i , not n i+1 , . . . , not n i+j } is often written as: In this way programs are identified with default theories of a special syntactic form. Let the extensions for default theories be defined as usual, and let the consequences of default theories be defined as the members of all extensions.
Proposition B.13. For every program Π :
• if X is an answer set for Π then dc(X) is an extension for Π (after translating as sketched above), • every extension for Π is the deductive closure of an answer set for Π , and this answer set is determined uniquely.
